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INCITING TERRORISM ON THE INTERNET: AN APPLICATION OF 
BRANDENBURG TO TERRORIST WEBSITES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The unexpected attacks of September 11, 2001 abruptly shattered the 
illusory bubble of isolation that had heretofore kept America psychologically 
“safe” from the insanity of international terrorism.  The acts committed on that 
terrible day expanded the shadow of global terrorism directly to our borders.  
Unlike the focused military attack on Pearl Harbor and the targeted destruction 
of life and property in Oklahoma City perpetrated by our own citizens, 
September 11th made us the victims of a dogma war that is marked by random 
and incomprehensibly horrific acts, wrought by a loose network of fanatics 
who are joined not by the ideals and conventional nationalism of past conflicts, 
but instead by an aberrant religious belief that includes a command to kill 
Americans.1  Such fanatics are identifiable not by a particular geography or 
country, but instead by their untenable hatred of the United States and single-
minded devotion to the annihilation of our way of life.  Who are our 
antagonists, and when will they strike again?  Despite our technology, our 
military might, and our global position as the last standing superpower, we 
really do not know precisely who, where, or when, but we are absolutely 
certain that terrorism is no longer the remote problem of other nations: we are 
its direct victims and have little assurance that it can be effectively stopped.  
We intuitively know this as Americans because it is the freedom inherent to 
our open way of life that ironically provides easy access to us as targets and 
provides our enemies with the same legal protection of individual rights:  
rights that can be openly abused to facilitate the execution of acts intended to 
destroy our way of life.  A lot has changed in the United States since 
 
 1. Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Laden et al., Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders: World 
Islamic Front Statement at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm (Feb. 23, 
1998).  From a religions ruling (fatwa) issued by Usama bin Laden and his associates: 
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual 
duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in 
order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for 
their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any 
Muslim.  This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, “and fight the pagans 
all together as they fight you all together,” and “fight them until there is no more tumult or 
oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah.” 
Id. 
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September 11th, and one of the most significant changes of all is the feeling of 
powerlessness that will be with us until the evil that spawns terrorism has been 
identified and subjected to the justice of civilized nations.  Until then, we will 
be constantly looking over our shoulders, no longer safe from the unspeakable 
evils that torment the world.  Because we cannot know for certain when the 
next attack will come or from where it will strike, we have been forced to an 
unprecedented threshold of danger that is already having a significant impact 
on our freedom and our daily lives.2 
At various times during our history the judiciary has had to balance the 
scope of individual constitutional rights against Congress’s legitimate role to 
protect our democratic system.3  It is a recurrent truism that a majority of 
Americans will choose national security and personal safety in exchange for 
certain restrictions of individual rights when faced with the potential for 
catastrophic consequences, particularly during periods of war and times when 
our society was perceived to be in danger from radical influence.4 A 
fundamental right that has consistently come under attack at such times is the 
right to free speech, especially when the speech at issue is unpopular or 
inconsistent with the majority view of traditional American societal norms, 
thus perceived as a danger of such magnitude that a response more immediate 
than public debate is deemed warranted.5  Freedom of speech is one of our 
 
 2. See, e.g., U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).  Air 
travel in general and airport security specifically have been highly visible manifestations of the 
nation’s shift toward increased vigilance through restrictions in the name of safety.  The added 
restrictions have resulted in substantial impositions on the freedom of the traveling public to 
move about in airports without being subjected to x-rays, physical searches and potential felony 
charges for something as innocuous as making jokes.  Other signs of changes in our society are 
not as visible, but potentially more damaging to individual freedoms.  The most obvious example 
is the Patriot Act, which expands the powers of the Federal Government to gather information 
and invade privacy.  Id. 
 3. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). This theme was succinctly 
summarized by Justice Holmes when he articulated his “clear and present danger” test.  Id. 
 4. In modern times, the airport experience is the most visible example of this proposition.  
People often express their agreement with heightened, often-invasive security searches if safety is 
at stake.  See Jere Longman, A Nation Challenged: Airport Delays; Waits Increasing for Air 
Travelers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at A1; ARTHUR J. SABIN, IN CALMER TIMES: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND RED MONDAY 46 (1999).  From a historical perspective, Professor Sabin 
concludes that the Dennis trial and its fallout was a “mirror of American society,” broad elements 
of which were fearful of the potential for “losing” America to the communists resulting in a 
resolute effort to eliminate the threat of communism at home.  Id. (referring to Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)). 
 5. The Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2000) (enacted in 1940).  The Smith Act is an 
example of a statute that restricts First Amendment rights.  Passed in 1940 in reaction to the 
events taking place in Europe, it reads in part: 
Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, . . . or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, 
or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the Unites States . . . ; or 
Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of [the government of the 
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most protected rights.6  With few exceptions, one of which will be examined 
here, speech that contributes to the free exchange of diverse ideas is 
constitutionally welcome, no matter how unpopular, misguided, or repugnant it 
is perceived to be.  The constitutional answer to repugnant ideas has evolved, 
during our relatively short American history, from one of outright suppression 
of unpopular speech and prosecution of those who promulgated it7 to the 
modern concept of a “free trade in ideas,” where the response to unpopular 
speech is simply more speech.8  Under this ideal, a multiplicity of ideas is 
encouraged to congregate in the public arena of debate, thereby exposing the 
false by illuminating it with the truth.9  The virtually unrestrained freedom of 
expression we enjoy in America is central to the idea of a democracy where the 
minority voice is sustained by the force of law, necessary to counter the 
oppressive tendency of unadulterated majority rule. 
Notwithstanding the expansive range of the First Amendment right to free 
speech, not all speech is protected, and the right to free speech is not 
absolute.10  Throughout our history, the Court has recognized certain types of 
speech as being of such low value or being so harmful to an ordered society as 
 
United States], prints, publishes, . . . or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or 
propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force of 
violence, or attempts to do so . . . Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned for 
not more than twenty years or both. 
Id. 
 6. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 964 (14th ed., 
2001).  “The Court has shown special judicial solicitude for free speech, meaning that 
governmental action directed at expression must satisfy a greater burden of justification than 
government action directed at most other forms of behavior.”  Id. 
 7. Reference here is to the Alien and Sedition Acts passed while John Adams was President 
in an attempt to cancel the perceived threat to the nation from the radical ideas emanating from 
the French Revolution.  At the time, war with France was imminent, and Congress reacted with 
the Alien Act to rid the nation of aliens who were believed at the time to be plotting against the 
U.S. and generally creating an atmosphere of hostility.  The Sedition Act criminalized public 
criticism of the government, the President or Congress.  See An Act Concerning Aliens, 1 Stat. 
570 (1798); An Act in Addition to the Act Entitled An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes 
Against the United States, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).  See also SABIN, supra note 4, at 14. 
 8. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams laid the foundation for the modern view of freedom of expression. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (Justice Holmes recognized that 
First Amendment protection does not extend to “every possible use of language.”  He explained 
that neither Hamilton nor Madison ever thought that criminalizing the counsel of murder would 
be an interference with free speech rights under the Constitution); accord Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“It is a fundamental principle, long established that the freedom of 
speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to 
speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and 
unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the 
punishment of those who abuse this freedom.”). 
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failing to rise to the level of protected speech even within the construct of a 
free exchange of ideas.11  The type of unprotected speech that will be 
examined here is incitement type speech, i.e., speech that “incites imminent 
lawless action,” with a focus on the incitement of terrorist acts via the Internet.  
Speech that incites lawless activity, or has the tendency to do so, has 
historically failed to find sanctuary in the Constitution.  In a famous and 
arguably the first substantive free speech opinion produced by the Supreme 
Court, Justice Holmes used the analogy of a man falsely shouting fire in a 
crowded theater and creating a panic as representative of harmful and therefore 
unprotected speech.12 
This general argument that the Constitution does not protect speech 
tending to incite harm or criminal activity has prevailed throughout the Court’s 
First Amendment jurisprudence.13  Additionally, the Court has wrestled with 
the paradox between an open democracy and a constitution that arguably 
protected the right to advocate the destruction of the American democratic 
government through anarchy, sedition, and the promulgation of some 
extremely unpopular and, under the circumstances, truly reprehensible ideas.14  
 
 11. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 6, at 965-68.  Throughout our First Amendment 
jurisprudence there has been a debate with regard to whether the constitutional right is absolute or 
whether there are competing interests that require a balancing of the free speech right against 
compelling state interests.  Certain types of speech, however, have been universally recognized as 
warranting either no or less protection, i.e., obscenity, fighting words, libel, and incitement.  Id. 
 12. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 13. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 
119-20 (Jamie Kalven, ed., 1988).  An often quoted hypothetical supporting the argument that 
even expressions of opinion when stated under certain circumstances do not deserve protection, is 
from John Stuart Mill: “An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor . . . ought to be 
unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when 
delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer.”  JOHN STUART 
MILL, ON LIBERTY 76 (Atlantic Monthly Press ed., 1921). 
 14. For a concise history and a discussion on the Supreme Court’s role in defining the scope 
of the rights of individuals who advocated communism, see generally, SABIN, supra note 4.  
Representative of “reprehensible ideas” were communists who sought violent overthrow of the 
U.S. government and the capitalist system.  So great was the fear and loathing for a form of 
government in America that beginning with the early 1900’s and the Russian revolution where 
communism became a reality through the Cold War years when communism reached its zenith in 
the world, those even remotely connected to communism came under vociferous attack and were 
subjected to criminal charges, loss of livelihood, and stained reputations.  All segments of the 
government, including the judiciary, participated to further an objective of total ruin of the 
communist party in the United States.  Looking back on those years, we can observe and judge 
retrospectively, McCarthyism, the actions of the Hoover FBI, and the raw oppressive power of a 
federal government bent on eliminating this threat to our way of life.  But, what would have been 
the outcome for America if the communist movement were not treated as a threat?  At the turn of 
the century, the United States was still a fragile nation, having barely won its independence from 
England, scarred by its narrow escape from civil war, and a participant in a world war with 
Germany, including an incursion into Russia during the popular revolution.  Victorious from the 
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Despite the Court’s continual expansion of the protection of the First 
Amendment, incitement to imminent lawless activity is still an exception to 
constitutional speech protection.15 
The path taken by the Court to establish our modern free speech rights will 
be explored in sufficient detail to provide a historical overture to the modern 
incitement exception, established by the Court in its 1969 decision, 
Brandenburg v. Ohio.16  The Brandenburg decision was the culmination of a 
number of significant Supreme Court decisions that struggled with the scope of 
First Amendment protection for the universal evil of inciting others to commit 
illegal acts.17  Although Brandenburg is read as significantly expanding First 
Amendment protection by extending protection to mere advocacy, it 
nonetheless preserved an exception for incitement type speech where such 
speech is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action.”18  Because of the necessity to show 
that the speech in question is advocating imminent lawless action, the 
exception provided by the Court in Brandenburg is narrow and difficult to 
satisfy, triggering the strictest scrutiny by the courts in order that the broadest 
spectrum of ideas can be freely exchanged in the public discourse.19  As 
narrow as it is, however, the exception exists because the Court steadfastly 
acknowledges the necessity in allowing for circumstances where speech that 
 
“war to end all wars,” the United States became a world leader as the industrial age blossomed, 
fueled by capitalism, and brought with it enormous wealth and power to a feisty young nation.  In 
its zeal to grow, capitalism’s excesses treated labor as fodder and left to its own devices; lead the 
country to unprecedented economic depression and the financial ruin of most Americans.  Under 
circumstances such as these, when much of the country was suffering largely at the hands of 
unrestrained capitalism and failed government policy, it is not difficult to envision a substantial 
vulnerability to the message of communism as an alternative to the system that was responsible 
for the ruin of so many.  Given that context, it is equally not difficult to understand the 
government’s response as increased vulnerability also increased the reality of danger from the 
advocacy of a radically different form of government.  Today we can see how communism utterly 
failed.  Was the oppression of communism in the United States during the twentieth century 
justified if it saved us from the eventual outcome suffered by the people of the Soviet block 
countries?  Certainly we could not predict the ultimate outcome in those early days, but it was 
clear that American ideals of freedom and individual opportunity were held in high value and 
were at substantial risk.  Because of this fear that American ideals might be lost, some of the 
ideals that America represented were discounted in the name of self-preservation, saving their 
restoration for the day the threat was inconsequential.  Id. 
 15. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v.United 
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U.S. 652 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Dennis v. United States, 341 
U.S. 494 (1951). 
 18. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added). 
 19. Id. at 448. 
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advocates harm cannot be effectively countered with the constitutionally 
favored solution of more speech.20 
The focus of this paper will analyze the Brandenburg exception for 
application to censure terrorist Internet sites advocating the murder of 
Americans and the destruction of American property.  The proposed solution 
will examine in particular the imminence element of the exception, showing 
how Brandenburg can be used as appropriate authority for challenging terrorist 
incitement-type speech transmitted via the Internet.  Modern First Amendment 
incitement jurisprudence is grounded in the scenario of a contemporaneous 
setting between “speaker” and “hearer” concluding that speech is protected, 
unless the lawless action advocated is imminent and likely to incite or produce 
such action. 
In order to be of service to society, the law must possess a certain elasticity 
that allows its application to a variety of scenarios.  But, as cyberspace has 
replaced the soapbox as the “poor man’s” forum for the propagation of 
messages and ideas, the Court has not yet fully explored the unique 
characteristics of a ubiquitous electronic forum, where speakers are unseen and 
listeners unknown in a non-contemporaneous setting.  There is no question that 
the terrorists infesting the world today are single-minded in their determination 
to accomplish their evil objectives and are quite willing to die in the process.  
Surely speech that advocates murder and wanton destruction is not worthy of 
sheltered access in the “marketplace of ideas.”  Should terrorist websites 
advocating the murder of our people and destruction of our nation be shielded 
by the Constitution on the basis that speech is an effective response to a 
terrorist’s message?  A common-sense response might be no, but if the forum 
is the Internet and the Brandenburg exception is applied, the answer is yes.  
Applying traditional Brandenburg analysis to challenge the validity of First 
Amendment protection to a website inciting others to conduct terrorism against 
the United States has some problems, chief among them the need to satisfy the 
imminence prong of the test.  But, under the circumstances that exist today, 
this paper proposes a novel approach to the application of the Brandenburg 
exception to place websites advocating terrorism outside the pale of 
constitutional protection. 
The Internet, more than any other medium to date, is perceived to possess 
the potential to grant everyone a similar power to freely trade in ideas, a 
concept eloquently articulated by Justice Holmes as the ideal for free 
 
 20. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
[I] think we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of 
opinions we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently 
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an 
immediate check is required to save the country. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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expression in an open democratic society.21  Proponents of the Internet tend to 
be free expression absolutists and, not unlike other purists, fiercely guard the 
right to free speech under any circumstances.22  But, the Court has not adopted 
an absolutist view, opting instead to provide expansive yet not all 
encompassing protection to free expression.23  If the freedom of speech is 
therefore not absolute, how do we determine, for a given set of circumstances, 
when expression can be restricted?  Brandenburg provides the basis for 
making that determination for speech that incites others to unlawful activity, 
but its modern application has been to situations more akin to the real-time 
characteristics of a soapbox than to the virtual, extra-contemporaneous 
character of the Internet.  Since the advent of the Internet, no website to date 
has been challenged under the Brandenburg exception, even though there are 
some sites that have generated a First Amendment challenge under a “true 
threat” theory.24  Is incitement type speech on the Internet protected because of 
the nature of the Internet itself and the perceived difficulty attached to 
satisfying the imminence element of Brandenburg?  Does the nature of the 
Internet foreclose the application of the exception to any alleged incitement 
speech found there?  Put another way, is it possible that the Internet opens a 
loophole in the Brandenburg exception? 
This paper examines an approach to the application of the Brandenburg 
incitement exception to websites that advocate terrorist acts against the United 
States under specific circumstances and suggests a constitutional basis to 
censure such sites without disturbing the significant progress the Court has 
made toward protecting the right of free speech.  The suggested approach 
adopts the position that the circumstances that now exist within the United 
States arising from the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 and the 
subsequent heightened state of national alert to terrorist activity has placed the 
 
 21. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 22. Internet proponents use the First Amendment to defend the right to free speech as 
zealously as the National Rifle Association uses the Second Amendment to defend the right to 
possess firearms.  For an example, see generally MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING 
FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE (1998). 
 23. Koningsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (“[W]e reject the view 
that freedom of speech and association . . . are absolutes.”). 
 24. Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1062-64 
(9th Cir. 2002) (Planned Parenthood challenged a site known as “The Nuremberg Files,” a site 
devoted to ending abortion and infamous for listing the names and personal information of 
abortion doctors along with a graphic representation of their status, e.g., injured or killed.  The 
site and two anti-abortion posters were challenged on a “true threat” theory, alleging that the site 
and the posters represented a threat to the safety and lives of the abortion doctors listed on the 
site).  For an in depth discussion of threats and incitement, see generally Steven G. Gey, The 
Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value of Threats, 78 TEX. L. REV 541 (2000); John P. 
Cronan, The Next Challenge for the First Amendment: The Framework for an Internet Incitement 
Standard, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 425 (2002). 
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likelihood of further terrorist acts at a “threshold of imminence” such that the 
serious advocacy of terrorist acts via the Internet can be placed beyond the pale 
of constitutional protection in accord with the Brandenburg incitement 
exception.  In the next section, Part II, a historical review of the Supreme 
Court’s development of First Amendment incitement doctrine is examined to 
establish the backdrop for the current incitement standard, beginning with 
Justice Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test in Schenck v. United States25 
to the reformulation of the test in Dennis v. United States.26  Part III examines 
the landmark Brandenburg decision and the founding of the modern incitement 
exception, showing how the Court has applied it in modern times.  
Representative Internet sites are considered in Part IV, including a brief look at 
a terrorist website, setting the stage in Part V for an examination of a proposed 
application of the Brandenburg incitement exception to challenge websites 
advocating terrorism. 
II.  EVOLUTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT INCITEMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
The backdrop to the Court’s first substantive foray into First Amendment 
speech protection was the First World War (the fight with Germany) and the 
United States’ incursion into Russia at the time of the Russian revolution.  The 
early cases dealt with speech made during wartime where the “speakers” were 
prosecuted and convicted under provisions of the Espionage Act of 1917 for 
advocating resistance to the military.27  The mood of the nation was such that 
the war was considered unavoidable, and conscription was believed by the 
majority of the population to be a “necessary and just” way to raise a national 
army.28  It was in this context and under such circumstances that the Court 
considered the power of government to regulate speech.29 
 
 25. Shenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 26. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951). 
 27. Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917).  As enacted on June 15, 
1917, the Espionage Act established the following offenses: 
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make of convey false reports or 
false statements with intent to interfere with the operation of success of the military or 
naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies and whoever, 
when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, 
disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, 
or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the 
injury of the service or of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than 
$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both. 
Id. 
 28. ZECHARAIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, 36 (1954). 
 29. See, e.g., Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (D.C.N.Y. 1917).  The genesis of 
judicial circumscription of the free expression of subversive advocacy had its beginnings two 
years before the Supreme Court decided its first significant free speech case.  In July of 1917, 
District Court Judge Learned Hand granted an injunction against the postmaster of New York 
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A. The Wartime Trilogy 
In 1919, the Supreme Court decided three cases within a week of each 
other, all involving violations of various provisions of the 1917 Espionage 
Act30 during the United States’ involvement in the First World War.31  The 
opinions were all written by Justice Holmes and represented the Supreme 
Court’s first significant analysis of the scope of First Amendment protection 
for speech that advocated unlawful activity.32 
1. Schenck v. United States 
Justice Holmes wrote the unanimous opinion in Schenck, the first case in 
the trilogy, establishing the “clear and present danger” test that became a 
foundation for deciding whether certain speech advocating lawless action was 
shielded by the Constitution.33  Schenck was the general secretary of the 
Socialist Party and was convicted for conspiring to violate the Espionage Act 
of 1917 by printing circulars denouncing the conscription statute and urging 
resistance to the draft.34  Schenck asserted that the First Amendment protected 
the circulars, and it was on this ground that the case made it to the Supreme 
 
who had refused to accept the publications of the Masses Publishing Company, a radical 
organization opposed to the military draft.  Id.  At issue was whether certain cartoons contained 
within the offending publications violated certain provisions of the Espionage Act, the same act 
that the Supreme Court would deal with two years later.  Id.  In arriving at his decision, Judge 
Hand used statutory construction of the act itself rather than the First Amendment as a judicial 
tactic for determining whether the cartoons fell within the provisions of the statute.  Id.  
Acknowledging that during times of war, Congress has the power to suppress activity possessed 
with the capacity to jeopardize the existence of the state, Judge Hand proceeded to define the 
scope of the postmaster’s authority to ban the mailings as that based on the language of the act 
and Congress’s intention of the act.  Id.  Construing the language of the statute proscribing the 
willful making of false statements as it applies to the cartoons, Judge Hand determines that the 
cartoons in question were within the “range of opinion and of criticism,” concluding that the 
authority granted by the right of free expression privileges such statements.  Id.  Judge Hand’s 
decision was reversed on appeal, but what is remarkable about the Masses opinion is that Judge 
Hand draws a line between a legitimate state power to limit to expression that functions as a 
“trigger of [illegal] action” and mere political agitation, positioning the line at a point where 
agitation becomes a “direct incitement to violent resistance.”  Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 
24 (2d Cir. 1917).  The distinction made by Judge Hand in Masses is an ironic backdrop to the 
path taken by the Supreme Court as it took up violations of the Espionage Act and the 
constitutional protection afforded such violations by the First Amendment.  Id. 
 30. Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat. at 219.  The key provisions of the 1917 Espionage Act 
violated by Schenck prohibited obstruction of military recruiting, causing insubordination within 
the military forces, use of the mails to send materials declared non-mailable by the Act, and for 
unlawfully using the mails to send such materials.  Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 31. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 205 (1919); Debs v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919). 
 32. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 6, at 964. 
 33. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48. 
 34. Id. (all facts articulated in this section are taken from the Court’s opinion in Schenck). 
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Court.  In his opinion, Justice Holmes observed that the leaflets would not have 
been sent unless Schenck intended for them to obstruct the military draft.35  
But, even if this assumption is true, Justice Holmes conceded that the messages 
printed on the circulars would be constitutionally protected in “many places 
and in ordinary times,” making it apparent that the first step in determining 
whether speech is protected by the First Amendment, is to consider the 
circumstances within which it is delivered.36  Justice Holmes made it clear, 
therefore, that the circumstances and the context within which speech is used 
can shift the boundaries of First Amendment protection.37  His famous 
example was of a man falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater and causing a 
panic: circumstances that according to Holmes would remove a First 
Amendment shield even under the “most stringent protection of speech.”38  
That same shout in an empty theater, or even in crowded theater when there 
really was a fire, would be fully protected.  In other words, speech by itself is a 
constant, but the circumstances in which it is used can vary the scope of 
constitutional protection.  Holmes’s proffered test to determine if otherwise 
protected speech belongs outside the protection of the First Amendment is 
whether it is used under such circumstances as to create a “clear and present 
danger” that the challenged speech would bring about the “substantive evils 
that Congress has a right to prevent.”39  Holmes was quite unequivocal when 
he said there is less tolerance for speech critical of the nation’s war policy 
while the nation is in a state of war than during peacetime and speech 
possessing even the tendency40 to obstruct a national war effort, cannot be 
 
 35. Id. at 51.  Here, Justice Holmes unlocks the door to modern First Amendment 
jurisprudence by noting that the First Amendment is not “confined to previous restraints.”  Id.  
Prior restraint involved a requirement to obtain a license from the government to publish printed 
matter, having its roots in English law.  In order to own and operate a printing press, for example, 
a license was required from the government; presumably the government could revoke the license 
at will, thereby effectively controlling what was printed.  From the time the Bill of Rights was 
enacted and throughout much of the 19th century, it was generally thought that the First 
Amendment was a response to prior restraint.  Under this construction, the protection afforded to 
speech by the Constitution was limited and until the Supreme Court began its First Amendment 
journey in the 20th Century, the government could, and did, restrict speech with few challenges.  
The almost casual acknowledgement by Justice Holmes that the First Amendment stands for 
more than a response to prior restraint was an important pronouncement under the circumstances. 
 36. Id. at 52. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLES DARLING PRIVILEGE”: 
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 384-89 (2000) (explaining 
that the “bad tendency” test employed to suppress speech was used extensively by abolitionists to 
justify suppression of anti-slavery speech and can be found as far back in legal history as 
Blackstone.  The test required no actual consequences, nor was there any need to show a temporal 
connection between the so-called dangerous speech and the evil presumed to result from it.  As 
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sanctioned under the Constitution.41  The result of Holmes’s analysis is 
important because he has no trouble denying protection to speech that does not 
actually produce the intended effect or harm as long as it can be found to have 
been expressed with the requisite intent and possessed with the tendency for 
future mischief.42  Thus, the test for proscribing speech advocating unlawful 
action after Schenck was whether the challenged speech was used in 
circumstances that create a “clear and present danger” that a substantive evil 
may result.43  One such circumstance identified as justifying a contraction of 
the scope of First Amendment protection is when the nation is at war.44 
2. Frohwerk v. United States 
Decided a week after Schenck, the Court reviewed the conviction of Jacob 
Frohwerk who, like Schenck, was convicted for conspiring to violate 
Espionage Act.45  The offense arose from the publication of a number of 
articles in the Missouri Staats Zeitung, a newspaper of limited circulation, 
strongly decrying the hypocritical involvement of the United States in the war 
against Germany and condemning the draft as a wrong greater than the wrong 
committed by one who resists it.  The Court rendered a unanimous opinion, 
sustained the convictions, and referred to its decision in Schenck.46  One of the 
things worth noting about Frohwerk, in the context of the First Amendment, is 
Justice Holmes’s concession that criticism of the government even during war 
would not be a crime under some circumstances.47  This was somewhat 
inconsistent with his opinion in Schenck, where the fact that the nation was at 
war seemed to hold some significance to where the protection boundary is 
drawn.48  Applying the “clear and present danger” test to the record at hand, 
Holmes found sufficient danger in the possibility that the newspaper could 
have stirred up some real mischief, likening the articles to “a little breath” but 
“enough to kindle a flame” if that possibility was relied on by the authors.49  
While the actual “clear and present danger” found in both Frohwerk and 
Schenck seems incongruent with a common understanding of the literal terms, 
 
can be seen from the Schenck decision, the bad tendency test continued to be a justification for 
speech suppression into the twentieth century). 
 41. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 205 (1919) (all facts articulated in this section 
are taken from the Court’s opinion in Frohwerk). 
 46. Id. at 206. 
 47. Id. at 208. 
 48. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 49. Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 209. 
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it is clear after Frohwerk that circumstances and the context within which 
words are used are determinative to the scope of speech protection. 
3. Debs v. United States 
The last case in the trilogy of wartime cases, Debs v. United States,50 was 
decided on the same day as Frohwerk and unanimously affirmed the 
conviction of one Eugene V. Debs for violations of the Espionage Act.51  
Eugene V. Debs was a leader of the Socialist movement and had run for 
president under the Socialist Party ticket numerous times, and therefore he was 
not within the class of relatively obscure characters who had run afoul of the 
Espionage Act in Schenck and Frohwerk.52  Mr. Debs was convicted under the 
provision of the Espionage Act criminalizing “causing or attempting to cause 
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty in the military,” the 
violations resulted from a public speech given in Canton, Ohio in June of 
1918.53  Mr. Debs was making a political speech expounding the economic 
virtues of Socialism and used the war as an example of the “supreme curse of 
capitalism.”54 The speech contained a harsh indictment of government 
(“master class”) declaring wars for which the working people (“subject class”) 
[involuntarily] furnished the corpses.55  The remarks were made at a 
convention of Socialists, were not directed specifically to persons subject to 
the draft or to soldiers, and did not advocate resistance to the draft,56 one of the 
factors distinguishing Debs’s speech from the speech activities of Messrs. 
Schenck and Frohwerk.  At his trial, Debs took the stand and frankly admitted 
his abhorrence of war and his opposition to it, while asserting that his speech 
did not justify the charges against him.57  Central to the justification that the 
Court used to affirm Debs’s conviction were the remarks he made concerning 
Rose Pastor Stokes, a woman convicted under the Espionage Act for 
attempting to cause insubordination in the military, stating at his trial that if 
she was guilty so was he.58  Another particular piece of evidence used by the 
Court to sustain the conviction was an “Anti-War Proclamation” that Debs 
referred to in his testimony to the jury, which was particularly damning 
because it contained a recommendation for “continuous, active and public 
opposition to the war.”59  The instructions given to the jury at his trial were 
 
 50. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
 51. Id. at 216. 
 52. See CHAFEE, supra note 28, at 84 n.89. 
 53. Debs, 249 U.S. at 212. 
 54. See CHAFEE, supra note 28, at 85. 
 55. Debs, 249 U.S. at 213. 
 56. Id. at 212-13. 
 57. Id. at 214. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 215. 
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such that if the “natural and intended effect” of his speech was to obstruct 
recruiting and, after considering all the circumstances, that was the probable 
effect, the speech would not be protected even if made in the context of a 
“general program and expressions of a general and conscientious belief.”60  In 
other words, even if Debs’s speech was found to be ordinarily protected 
political speech on the general topic of Socialism, if he intended for his speech 
to have the effect of obstructing the draft, and if there was a reasonable 
probability that the words used possessed the tendency to do so, there would be 
no constitutional protection for the offending words on the basis that they were 
part of an otherwise protected political speech.61  The jury found sufficient 
evidence under those instructions to return a verdict against Debs, which the 
Court unanimously affirmed.62 
When one considers that Debs was an activist politician who had been a 
candidate for the office of President of the United States four times prior to his 
conviction,63 coupled with the paucity of evidence that convicted him to a term 
of ten years for making what would certainly be considered today nothing 
more than a political speech, the justification for such a harsh outcome is one 
that is difficult to fathom, particularly under test labeled “clear and present 
danger.”  Is it that the perceived danger was partly found in Mr. Debs’s 
socialist views, which if fully realized would effectively finish the American 
system of republican government and individual freedom?  Considering the 
circumstances of the times, i.e., the war, revolution in Russia and the 
emergence of communism as a major system of government, the influx of 
immigrants with arguably radical views, and the vulnerability of the United 
States as it emerged on the world stage as a major power, it is possible to 
imagine such danger to the essence of Americanism, where extraordinary 
circumstances may exist whereby the first order of government is to survive, 
even at the risk of restricting individual rights.  Perhaps these thoughts offer 
some validation for the paradoxical decisions of the Court in the wartime cases 
as Justice Holmes articulated principles of broader protection for speech while 
sustaining the government restrictions.64 
 
 60. Debs, 249 U.S. at 216. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 217. 
 63. See CHAFEE, supra note 28, at 84 n.89.  In 1920 when he was in jail, Eugene Debs ran 
for President of the United States for the fifth time as the Socialist candidate, receiving 919,799 
votes, more than he had received in 1912 when he ran last.  Id. 
 64. See CHAFEE, supra note 28.  Professor Chafee suggests that Justice Holmes wrote the 
opinions in the wartime cases to promote the cause for expansive freedom of speech and was 
waiting for the right opportunity to break from the mold.  Id.  That opportunity came with the 
Abrams case, see infra at Section II.B. 
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4. The Wartime Trilogy Summarized 
Simply put, the wartime trilogy sustained statutes prohibiting expression 
by linking the challenged speech to the circumstances within which the speech 
was used to adjust the scope of constitutional protection.  Speakers, therefore, 
weren’t being punished for the results of their speech, but essentially for 
expressing ideas that coincidentally were immensely unpopular for the times.65  
The “clear and present danger” test established by the Court, while facially 
speech-friendly, was used instead to move the boundaries of the First 
Amendment to effectively bypass the protection normally afforded such speech 
under different, non-wartime, circumstances.  It has been argued with force 
that the decisions in these cases were a reflection of the popular sentiments of 
the times66 and that the trials were more political in nature than neutral 
examinations on the merits, thus failing to rise to the ideals of free expression 
set when the nation was born.67  But there is another argument to be made, and 
that is the danger perceived by Congress was genuine, and some restrictions 
were in order for self-preservation purposes.68  Did the Court properly affirm 
the statutory restrictions placed on mere expression?  In retrospect, the 
affirmations by themselves fall far short of the model for a free and open 
society.  But what can be drawn from these decisions, when considered in the 
context of the geo-political situation of the times is a certain support for the 
proposition that the First Amendment has boundaries that may be altered under 
circumstances where a perceived danger is so great that it outweighs the 
potential to expose the necessary detours along the path of achieving the 
highest standards of the American ideal. 
 
 65. SABIN, supra note 4, at 19-20. 
 66. Id. at 45 (reviewing the trial of Eugene Dennis, Solicitor-General of the Communist 
Party, Professor Sabin makes a similar observation when he refers to the trial as “mirroring 
American Society”). 
 67. Id. at 14 (referencing the assertion that America held itself out as an “exemplar of the 
right of free expression”). 
 68. COMMUNISM, THE COURTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN 
CIVILIZATION 2 (Allen Guttmann & Benjamin Munn Ziegler eds., 1964).  The 1917 Russian 
Revolution bore stark witness to the violent overthrow of an established government by a small, 
dedicated group of revolutionaries.  While the Socialists in America were attempting to acquire 
power through the democratic processes, Communist Party of the United States adopted a 
position of agitation and preparation for violent overthrow of the U.S. government.  Following is 
a quote from Lenin’s Third International, a twenty-one manifesto adopted by the American 
Communist and American Communist Labor parties: 
It is [the duty of Communists] to create everywhere a parallel illegal organization 
machine which at the decisive moment will be helpful to the party in fulfilling its duty to 
the revolution.  In all countries where the Communists, because of a state of siege and 
because of exceptional laws directed against them, are unable to carry on their work 
legally, it is absolutely necessary to combine legal with illegal activities. 
Id. 
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B. Abrams v. United States69 and Justice Holmes’s Dissent 
In 1918, the Espionage Act of 1917 was amended to include provisions 
that significantly expanded the reach of government speech suppression, 
adding broad proscriptions to seditious publications that encouraged resistance 
to war effort and advocated the curtailment of war material production.70  It 
was in this more expansive web that Abrams was caught, an apt analogy 
because in the larger context Abrams and his associates were minnows in the 
ocean of world events.  Abrams was the leader of a pathetic band of Russian 
Jewish émigrés, who were self-styled “rebels” actively opposing the United 
States’ encroachment into Russia during the war with Germany.71  Operating 
from a basement in New York, Abrams printed a number of leaflets, some in 
English and some in Yiddish, decreeing the hypocrisy of the United States for 
its incursion into Russia and alleging that the real reason for the invasion was 
to join with German militarism to put down the Bolshevist “worker” 
revolution.72  They distributed their leaflets by throwing them out of the fourth 
floor of a hat factory in New York City, which graphically demonstrates how 
small and ineffectual Abrams and his group were.73  When this case arrived at 
the Supreme Court, just eight months after deciding Debs, one would have 
confidently predicted that Holmes would merely add Abrams to the Schenck 
progeny.  But it was not Holmes who wrote the opinion: It was Justice Clarke, 
who relied on the “clear and present danger” test in Schenck to flatly reject 
Abrams’s First Amendment claim.74  In his remarkable dissent, Holmes quite 
clearly laid out a path that diverges from the Schenck trilogy by pronouncing 
that before speech can be restricted, it must engender imminent danger.75  
 
 69. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 70. KALVEN, supra note 13, at 139.  The provisions of the amended Espionage Act of 1917, 
40 Stat. 553 (1918) applicable to the prosecution of Abrams were: (i) publishing “disloyal, 
scurrilous and abusive language about the form of Government of the United States;” (ii) 
publishing language “intended to bring the form of Government of the United States into 
contempt, scorn, contumely and disrepute;” (iii) publishing language “intended to incite, provoke 
and encourage resistance to the United States in said war;” (iv) “by utterance, writing, printing an 
publication, to urge, incite and advocate curtailment of the war.”  Id. 
 71. See CHAFEE, supra note 28, at 109-10. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 109. 
 74. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617-24. 
 75. Id. at 619.  Inferentially, one can conclude that the ineffectual nature of Abrams’s efforts, 
which Holmes characterizes earlier in his opinion as “the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet 
by an unknown man,” did not rise to the level of immediate danger necessary to pass muster 
under the clear and present danger test.  Holmes then reveals his belief that the true reason 
Abrams was sent to prison for twenty years had more to do with his political beliefs that the Court 
has no right to consider in the context of the charges.  It is likely that Holmes was outraged at the 
severity of the punishment meted out by the government and believed that hysteria, not reason 
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Holmes’s dissent is of critical importance to free speech proponents because he 
stated that speech merely advocating illegal action without directly linking the 
speech to an imminent danger produced or intended should be accorded the 
protection of the Constitution.76  Thus, the “clear and present danger” test as 
clarified by Holmes now has a definition more akin to its literal moniker, i.e., 
we now know that it requires some linkage to an immediate danger.  This has 
the startling effect of transforming the application of the test to justify 
restricting expression to one that is speech protective.77  Through his dissent, 
Holmes tried to reconcile the conflict between government restriction of 
loathsome opinions and the ideal of a free exchange of ideas of all types.78  
However, the idea that truth will emerge victorious through a market-like 
exchange among competing, even unpopular or “loathsome,” opinions implies 
a desire for a dialogue and an opportunity for persuasion, rebuttal, and, 
ultimately, conversion.  Without the basic elements of discourse, the value of 
the marketplace is limited if not altogether valueless.  It is worth noting that 
even as Holmes expanded the scope of First Amendment protection, he did not 
abandon the belief that circumstances can still control the boundaries of 
protection.79  Not only did Holmes affirm the constitutionality of punishing 
 
was controlling the situation.  Id.  For additional information on Holmes’s motivation to dissent 
in Abrams, see SABIN, supra note 4, at 19. 
 76. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); SABIN, supra note 4, at 19. 
 77. See SABIN, supra note 4, at 19. 
 78. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Holmes’s dissent in Abrams is most 
famous for laying the foundations of modern free speech doctrine with the following bit of 
eloquence: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical.  If you have no 
doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart, you 
naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.  To allow opposition 
by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that 
he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole heartedly for the result, or that you 
doubt either your power or your premises.  But when men have realized that time has 
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the 
very foundations of their own conduct that that the ultimate good desired is better reached 
by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which 
their wishes safely can be carried out.  That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.  
It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.  Every year if not every day we have to 
wager our salvation upon some prophecy based on imperfect knowledge.  While that 
experiment is part of our system, I think we should be eternally vigilant against attempts 
to check the expression of opinions we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless 
they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes 
of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. at 630-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  “Only the emergency that makes it immediately 
dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the 
sweeping command, ‘Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.’”  Id. 
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speech that “produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger,” 
he similarly affirmed that the power to restrict speech is greater in wartime.80  
Although Holmes raised the constitutional shield substantially higher, one can 
still find from his dissent in Abrams the principle that speech itself is a 
constant and that the determination as to whether the speech is within or 
without constitutional protection should be made from the circumstances, thus 
leaving intact a foundational exception from unrestrained speech from the 
Schenck trilogy.81 
C. The Syndicalism Era – Peacetime Speech Restrictions 
The next two cases arose after the First World War and deal with 
subversive advocacy or the violation of state statutes prohibiting the advocacy 
of overthrow of the government by force, violence, assassination, or any 
unlawful means.82  The oldest of these statutes was enacted in New York in 
1902, following the assassination of President McKinley, and is representative 
of the criminal syndicalism statues enacted by many states.83 
1. Gitlow v. New York84 
Benjamin Gitlow was convicted under New York’s criminal anarchy law, 
which made it a crime to advocate the forceful overthrow of organized 
 
 80. Id. at 627-28 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 82. See KALVEN, supra note 13, at 163. 
 83. N.Y. PENAL LAW, §§ 160-61 (1902) (current amended version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
240.15 (1999)).  Section 160 provides: 
Criminal Anarchy Defined. Criminal anarchy is the doctrine that organized government 
should be overthrown by force or violence, or by assassination of the executive head or of 
any of the executive officials of government, or by any unlawful means, the advocacy of 
such doctrine either by word of mouth or writing is a felony. 
Id., § 160.  Section 161 provides: 
Advocacy of Criminal Anarchy. Any person who: (1) By word of mouth or writing 
advocates, advises or teaches the duty, necessity or propriety of overthrowing or 
overturning organized government by force or violence, or by assassination of the 
executive head of or of any of the executive officials of government, or by any unlawful 
means; or (2) prints, publishes, edits, issues or knowingly circulates, sells, distributes or 
publicly displays any book paper, document, or written or printed matter in any form, 
containing or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine that organized government 
should be overthrown by force, violence or any unlawful means . . . is guilty of a felony 
and punishable by imprisonment, . . . fine . . . or both. 
Id., § 161. 
 84. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (it is important to note that one of the most 
important and enduring aspects of Gitlow is that it incorporated the First Amendment into the 
Fourteenth, thereby making federal free speech rights applicable to the states). 
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government.85  His punishable offense was the act of publishing and 
distributing copies of a document called the “Left Wing Manifesto,” which 
urged a departure from the evolution of socialism through the democratic 
process in favor of militant revolution.86  On appeal to the Supreme Court, 
Justice Sanford took up the question of whether the absence of evidence of any 
illegal result arising from the publication of the Manifesto should be found to 
violate a statute that does not criminalize mere statements of doctrine, as that 
statute had been construed by the trial judge.87  The Court also considered the 
constitutionality of a statute that punishes speech without considering the 
circumstances within which it is spoken.88  It is easy to see the impact that 
Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams had on the arguments raised by the 
defendants.  But, in his majority opinion affirming the conviction, Justice 
Sanford found that while the statute did not prohibit academic discussion or the 
advocacy of changes in government within the framework of the democratic 
process, the language in the Manifesto advocating unlawful overthrow of 
government did violate the statute.89  With regard to substantive danger that the 
statute was intended to guard against, the Court recognized the state’s right of 
self-preservation and pronounced it superior to the right of free speech, where 
the challenged speech advocates overthrow of the government or falls within a 
similar category of utterances.90  According to Justice Sanford, the right of 
self-preservation granted the state the power to pre-determine that certain 
speech, i.e., advocacy of acts intended to violently displace the government, 
were so antagonistic to the general welfare that it can be constitutionally 
proscribed.91  With Gitlow, a peacetime decision, the “clear and present 
danger” test from the wartime cases was not applied, and the justification for 
restricting speech is the authority accorded to the legislature in the exercise of 
its right of self-preservation.92  Holmes again dissented, steadfastly arguing 
 
 85. Id. at 654 (all facts articulated in this section are taken from the Court’s opinion in 
Gitlow). 
 86. Id. at 656 n.2 (describing Gitlow as a member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist 
party. This branch of the party, rather than accept the evolution of socialism through the 
democratic process, believed that it was necessary to “destroy the parliamentary state.”  The Left 
Wing Manifesto urged agitation and strikes as a strategy for achieving “mass industrial revolts” to 
be used as a prelude to revolution and militant replacement of capitalism with socialism). 
 87. Id. at 664. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 668. 
 92. Id. The Court granted great deference to the legislature’s predetermination of the 
substantive evil of anarchy and refused to strike down the statute as unconstitutional unless it was 
found to be arbitrary or unreasonable.  Id.  The Court had no difficulty finding that the State had 
the right to enact statutes to protect the general welfare.  Id.  Therefore, it was completely 
unnecessary in the Court’s view to consider the circumstances within which the Manifesto was 
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that the appropriate test is the “clear and present danger” test as stated in 
Schenck and modified with his Abrams dissent.93  Under the Holmes modified 
“clear and present danger” test, speech may be proscribed if there exists an 
element of propinquity linking the speech to an immediate attempt to bring 
about the substantive evil.94  His reference to Schenck was a clear reference 
that the circumstances must be considered when determining the danger that 
the objectionable speech could result in the identified transgression.95 
Thus, even in peacetime, a rationale placing self-preservation ahead of 
speech advocating against violent overthrow of the government is found to be 
a reasonable and necessary by the Supreme Court.  The struggle the Court is 
having with the conflict between individual free speech rights and the self-
preservation rights of a democracy is clear when the majority opinion and 
Holmes’s dissent are read together.  Even though Holmes and Brandeis 
promoted expansive free speech rights rejected by the majority, Holmes’s 
eloquence and reason cannot be ignored and started to have some effect, as 
evidenced by Gitlow’s argument that his acquittal should be assured in the 
absence of some immediate evil resulting from his publishing and distributing 
the Manifesto.  But even as he argued in his dissent that Gitlow’s Manifesto 
was protected by the Constitution, Holmes continued to allow an exception 
where speech could be proscribed by law if there would be any danger that the 
speech was capable of immediately producing any evil.96  The basic idea that 
speech can be proscribed if it produces evil continued to be common ground 
for the majority and the dissent in the strain to balance the individual free 
speech rights guaranteed by the Constitution against the power of a 
government to protect itself and its citizens. 
 
used or whether there was any remote possibility that the Manifesto could bring about anarchy at 
all.  Id.  It was only necessary to find that that the speech was of the type proscribed by the 
statute, i.e., that it advocated anarchy rather than merely state a doctrine.  Id. 
 93. Id. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 94. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Holmes’s eloquence is once again apparent in his dissent 
where he challenges the majority argument that the Manifesto was an incitement: 
Every idea is an incitement.  It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless 
some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at is birth.  
The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the 
narrower sense, is the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result.  Eloquence may set fire to 
reason. 
Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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2. Whitney v. California97 
Anita Whitney was prosecuted and convicted under the California 
Syndicalism statute,98 which criminalized membership or assembly with any 
group organized to advocate, teach, or aid and abet criminal syndicalism.99  
Unfortunately, the Court was unable to consider the First Amendment 
questions of free speech and assembly because those issues had not been 
properly raised on appeal, and the Court affirmed her conviction on the due 
process and equal protection questions that were raised.100  This case is 
noteworthy, however, for Justice Brandeis’s concurrence, which was actually 
written as a dissent to the majority opinion in Gitlow and is a concurrence only 
because the Court’s decision was in part a refusal to review First Amendment 
questions that had not been properly raised on appeal.101  In his opinion, 
Brandeis strongly challenged the propriety of a legislature determining, in 
advance of any circumstances, that assembly with a group organized to 
advocate syndicalism constituted a clear and present danger sufficient to 
suppress free speech.102  His fundamental argument was that the Founders 
recognized the necessity of public discourse of political questions to arrive at 
political truth and that this cannot happen where the government effects 
arbitrary suppression through statutes that facially address substantive evils, 
but which cannot possibly be relevant in situations where the circumstances 
actually fail to rise to the level of danger necessary to justify suppression of 
speech.103 
 
 97. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 98. California Criminal Syndicalism Act of 1919, CAL. STAT. 1919, c. 188, §§ 1-3, p. 281 
(1919). 
 99. California Criminal Syndicalism Act. § 1 defined “criminal syndicalism” as: 
any doctrine, or precept advocating, teaching or adding and abetting the commission of 
crime, sabotage ( . . . meaning willful and malicious physical damage, or injury to 
physical property), or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of 
terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control or 
effecting any political change. 
Id. 
 100. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 360-61.  The only constitutional questions considered by the Court 
were the Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection.  The Court confined its review 
of those questions only, noting that: “[O]ur review is to be confined that that question, since it 
does not appear, either from the order of the Court of Appeal or from the record otherwise that 
any other Federal Question was presented in and either expressly or necessarily decided by that 
court.”  Id. 
 101. Id. at 372-80 (Brandeis J., concurring). 
 102. Id. at 374 (Brandeis J., concurring). 
 103. Id. at 375 (Brandeis J., concurring).  For a fascinating analysis of Justice Brandeis’s 
concurrence in Whitney, and a sobering perspective of the Founding Fathers’ view of free speech, 
see generally Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L. REV. 1 (1971). 
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This is a powerful argument that will ultimately influence the expansion of 
First Amendment protection, but consider the core rationalization that Justice 
Brandeis offered for freedom of speech.  At the heart of his argument was that 
free speech is the protection the Constitution affords against injurious 
doctrine.104  This hypothesis was that falsity and “noxious doctrine” will be 
exposed by an active public discourse, unfettered by the government, as the 
public carries out its duty to participate in political discussion.105  His argument 
for expansive individual free speech rights closely resembled Justice Holmes’s 
“marketplace of ideas,” but Brandeis raised the political exchange of ideas to 
the level of a public duty, one that must not be breached if society is to be 
adequately protected from the harms inherent in a doctrine that threatens the 
existence of American democracy.  But, Brandeis was not a First Amendment 
absolutist; that is, he believed there were proper justifications for suppressing 
speech, as long as the basis for serious harm is reasonable, and the harm is 
imminent.106 
3. Summarizing the Imminence Issue Raised by Justices Holmes and 
Brandeis 
One line of reasoning which emanated from the analysis of Justices 
Holmes and Brandeis was the proposition that the potential for harm inherent 
in speech advocating unlawful action against society107 is adequately countered 
when there is time for debate and exploration of the truth.  The element of 
imminence therefore is of critical importance when deciding whether speech 
may be suppressed because, given sufficient time, one can intelligently explore 
all aspects of a dangerous notion and offer persuasive counter arguments to 
offset the presupposed harm.  The problem that the Court cannot come to grips 
with is how imminent must imminent be before the danger represented by 
certain speech becomes impervious to debate.108  Nor has the Court been able 
to articulate a standard for the level of danger that must exist to proscribe 
speech when the question of imminence may be unknown, or unpredictable.109  
 
 104. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis J., concurring). 
 105. Id. (Brandeis J., concurring). 
 106. Id. at 376 (Brandeis J., concurring). 
 107. For the sake of simplicity, the term “society” is used here to encompass the entirety of 
the American infrastructure, including its economic, justice and political systems. 
 108. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis J., concurring).  Justice Brandeis recognized the 
difficulty the Court has had with this question in his Whitney concurrence when he said: 
This Court has not yet fixed the standard by which to determine when a danger shall be 
deemed clear; how remote the danger may be and yet be deemed present; and what degree 
of evil shall be sufficiently substantial to justify resort to abridgment of free speech and 
assembly as the means of protection. 
Id. (Brandeis J., concurring). 
 109. Id. (Brandeis J., concurring). 
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The “clear and present danger” test and all of its variations therefore come 
down to a balancing test that can only be applied in the context of all of the 
circumstances.  Where the evil is so substantial, even incomprehensible, as 
terrorism undisputedly is, it seems appropriate to challenge the importance of 
the imminence element in the face of catastrophic danger.  If an insane person 
is holding a loaded gun to your head and is telling you why it is right and just 
that you should die, how long do you allow that person to speak before you are 
justified in pre-empting her argument?  Put another way, how much speech 
would be necessary to disarm her? 
D. The Cold War Period – Dennis v. United States110 
The trial of Eugene Dennis, general secretary of the Communist Party-
U.S.A., was undertaken at a time when the tension between communism and 
the world democracies was at its height and when one world crisis followed 
another.111  Dennis was convicted for violations of the Smith Act112 resulting 
from his membership in the Communist Party, which had adopted a policy of 
the overthrow of the United States government.113  The Dennis Court applied 
the “clear and present danger” test and, in so doing, was obligated to decide 
what the phrase means.114  The Court, while acknowledging that the trend in 
First Amendment jurisprudence was moving in the direction propounded by 
Holmes in his dissent in Gitlow and Brandeis in his concurrence in Whitney,115 
 
 110. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 111. The period of time following World War II, commonly referred to as the Cold War 
Period, was noted for the tension that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union.  
This tension produced significant fear, and irrational action on the part of American institutions 
such as the news media, the FBI, congress and the judiciary.  The Dennis trial is an example of 
the “Let’s give ‘em a fair trial and then we’ll hang ‘em” attitude that was prevalent toward 
communists during the Cold War Period, especially when Hoover was running the FBI.  It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the behind the scenes activity that was the backdrop 
for the Dennis case, and we will look at Dennis decision only for the contribution it made to 
shape the “clear and present danger” test.  For an excellent examination of Dennis v. United 
States including the political and societal attitudes that contributed to its outcome, see generally 
SABIN, supra note 4, at 31-50. 
 112. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 497.  Eugene Dennis et al. were charged with: 
Willingly and knowingly conspiring (1) to organize as the Communist Party of the United 
States of America as a society, group and assembly of persons who teach and advocate the 
overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by force and violence, 
and (2) knowingly and willfully to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of 
overthrowing and destroying the Government of the United States by force and violence. 
Id.  See also Alien Registration Act §§ 2-3, 54 Stat. 670 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2000)). 
 113. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 497. 
 114. Id. at 508-10. 
 115. See supra Sections II(C)(1-2). Recall from the discussion supra that the main thrust of 
Holmes’s and Brandeis’s argument is the necessity to demonstrate some emergency, or 
imminence of harm before speech can be suppressed. 
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nevertheless distinguished Dennis from these cases by pointing out that the 
circumstances in Dennis, i.e., “[T]he development of an apparatus designed 
and dedicated to the overthrow of the government in the context of world 
crises after crises,” was not comparable to the situations in Gitlow and 
Whitney.116  The test that the Court finally adopted was one that was articulated 
by Judge Learned Hand in a lower court decision.117  Judge Hand’s 
interpretation of the “clear and present danger” test adopted by the Court was 
as follows: “In each case, the [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 
‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as 
is necessary to avoid the danger.”118  In other words there is a “sliding scale” 
whereby the courts can determine whether First Amendment protection is 
warranted on the basis of the magnitude of the evil reduced by the probability 
that it is likely to occur.119  Applying this test, the Court found sufficient 
danger in the activities, even though there was no finding of an attempt to 
overthrow the government.120  The Court found significant danger in the fact 
that the Communist Party was highly organized, very disciplined, and, in 
effect, just waiting for that call from the leadership stating the time was ripe for 
violent overthrow of the [U.S.] government.121  Thus, the Court was able to 
apply the “clear and present danger” test, albeit in a modified form, to affirm 
the convictions of Dennis et al.122  Considering the circumstances that existed 
during the Cold War period, it is not unreasonable to conclude that a “self-
preservation” attitude was fostered by the tension of the times and that the 
perception of communism as a serious threat to the United States was not 
without foundation. 
III.  THE MODERN INCITEMENT EXCEPTION 
The modern constitutional test for incitement speech is found in the 
Court’s decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio.123  In Brandenburg, the Court 
 
 116. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510. 
 117. Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950). 
 118. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510. 
 119. For a graphic representation of Learned Hand’s Dennis test, see WILLIAM W. VAN 
ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 140 (1991). 
 120. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510. 
 121. Id. at 510-11. 
 122. Id.  It is worth recalling that the Schenck trilogy used the “clear and present danger” test 
to suppress speech while Holmes’s Gitlow dissent and Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence turned the 
test speech protective, thus positively influencing subsequent decisions.  Of note in Dennis is that 
the reformulation of the “clear and present danger” rule influenced by Judge Learned Hand 
reduces the necessity for immediacy, allowing the courts to suppress speech if the danger itself is 
significantly great, thus reverting the rule back to its original status as speech suppressive.  There 
is a certain irony in this as there is the belief among scholars that Judge Hand played a significant 
role in influencing Justice Holmes’s change of heart that is reflected in the Abrams dissent. 
 123. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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substantially narrowed the incitement exception by requiring that before 
speech can be suppressed, it must be “directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”124  The 
element of imminence coupled with the requirement to show that the illegal 
action advocated is likely to occur is a difficult test to satisfy and has virtually 
ensured the protection of speech advocating violent action, when the action 
does not immediately occur.  It is clear to see why Brandenburg represents a 
daunting hurdle when it is applied to Internet speech.  Without the temporal 
connection between the advocacy and the unlawful act, (direct “speaker - 
hearer” linkage), meeting the imminence requirement is virtually impossible.  
In fact, the common application of Brandenburg is to situations where the 
speaker and hearer are in the same place at the same time so that there is no 
question that the temporal linkage is in place.125 
A. Brandenburg v. Ohio126 
Clarence Brandenburg, a member of the Ku Klux Klan, was convicted for 
violating the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute, part of which criminalized the 
advocacy of violence as a means of political reform.127  At a cross-burning 
rally, which reporters attended, Brandenburg made a speech to a group of 
hooded figures, the substance of which was highly derogatory to Blacks and 
Jews.  Brandenburg’s speech was full of the predictable Klan garbage 
derogatory to blacks and Jews, but it was the following words that triggered his 
indictment and conviction: “We’re not a revengent [sic] organization, but if 
our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the 
white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some 
revengeance taken.”128 
Brandenburg appealed his conviction on First Amendment grounds, which 
was affirmed by the Appellate Court of Ohio and the Ohio Supreme Court as 
raising no First Amendment issues.129  But, the United States Supreme Court, 
in a per curiam decision, reversed Brandenburg’s conviction on the basis that 
First Amendment jurisprudence no longer supported the notion that mere 
 
 124. Id. at 447 (emphasis added). 
 125. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
 126. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444 (all facts articulated in this section are taken from the 
Court’s opinion in Brandenburg). 
 127. OHIO REV. CODE § 2923.13 (enacted 1919), which prohibited, “advocating the duty, 
necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means 
of accomplishing industrial or political reform and for voluntarily assembling with any society, 
group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal 
syndicalism.”  Id. 
 128. Id. at 446 (emphasis added). 
 129. Id. at 445.  Actually, the Ohio State Supreme Court dismissed the appeal sua sponte 
because it found no substantial constitutional question involved.  Id. 
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advocacy of unlawful acts without more loses the protection of the 
Constitution.130  Thus, the Court overruled its Whitney decision, holding in 
Brandenburg that advocacy of lawless action may not be proscribed unless it is 
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action.”131 
B. Applications of the Incitement Exception 
The Court’s decisions following Brandenburg demonstrate the narrow 
quality of the incitement exception.  The two cases that follow illustrate the 
expansive protection afforded free speech, even where the speech arguably is 
intended to initiate or continue unlawful activity. 
1. Hess v. Indiana132 
Gregory Hess was one of two to three hundred demonstrators at Indiana 
State University who were blocking the street during a protest of the United 
States’ involvement in the Vietnam War.  To clear the street, sheriff’s deputies 
walked up the street ordering the demonstrators to move to the sidewalks.  
Hess, with his back to the Sheriff, yelled out to the general crowd, “We’ll take 
the f***ing street again,” whereupon he was arrested and convicted for 
disorderly conduct.133  The Indiana Superior Court and Indiana Supreme Court 
upheld the conviction, and Hess subsequently appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court on First Amendment grounds.134 
The trial court that convicted Hess found that his statement was “intended 
to incite further lawless action on the part of the crowd in [his] vicinity and 
was likely to produce such action.”135  On review the Supreme Court reversed, 
finding that Hess’s words at worst could only be said to advocate illegal action 
at some indeterminate time in the future and holding that speech advocating 
unlawful action may only be proscribed when such advocacy is directed to 
inciting imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.136  Thus, the advocacy of lawless action at some indefinite time in the 
future fails to fall within the Brandenburg imminence exception. 
 
 130. Id. at 448.  The Brandenburg Court referred to dicta in Dennis where it acknowledged 
the Court’s distancing itself from the Gitlow and Whitney decisions, a clear indication that a 
linkage between advocacy and result must be apparent and that advocacy alone will not remove 
the protection of the First Amendment.  Id. 
 131. Id. at 447 (emphasis added). 
 132. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (all facts articulated in this section are taken from 
the Court’s opinion in Hess). 
 133. Id. at 110. 
 134. Id. at 105-06. 
 135. Id. at 108. 
 136. Id. 
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2. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware137 
Black members of the NAACP organized a boycott against white 
merchants in Claiborne County, Mississippi in response to the rejection of a 
petition of demands presented by black leaders that was aimed at securing a 
degree of justice for the black residents of the community.  During the boycott, 
some members of the black community refused to honor the boycott, 
prompting promises of “discipline” from Charles Evers, the NAACP Field 
Secretary in Mississippi.  In a speech made before a group of black community 
members calling for a total boycott of white businesses, Evers stated that if any 
of the boycott violators were caught, “we’re gonna [sic] break your damn 
neck[s].”138  The Court, citing the incitement exception in Brandenburg, found 
that although Evers’s speech contained powerful rhetoric, it failed to satisfy the 
incitement exception because it was not immediately followed by violence and 
observed that the acts of violence connected with the speech occurred weeks or 
months later.139 
The Court’s decision in Claiborne established with more clarity that 
incitement type speech, regardless of the content, must be closely followed by 
lawless action.140  A temporal gap (weeks) between the time speech is initiated 
and the lawless acts that are the subject of the speech can defeat the 
Brandenburg imminence exception. 
C. Analyzing the Essential Elements of Brandenburg 
The exception that remains from Brandenburg and its progeny is quite 
narrow and leaves significant doubt as to whether Holmes’s “clear and present 
danger” test has any remaining validity, particularly since the test as applied in 
Dennis was abandoned in this decision.141  The elements of the Brandenburg 
incitement exception thus established would uphold regulation of incitement 
speech only where speech is directed toward a person or group, advocates 
lawless action, and the speaker’s audience responds in timely fashion by doing 
the unlawful acts urged by the speaker.142 
1. Advocacy 
There is no black-letter definition for advocacy, but it is clear from the 
decisions in Schenck to Brandenburg that the term at least encompasses 
promotion of illegal action as distinguished from merely teaching an abstract 
 
 137. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (all facts articulated in this section 
are taken from the Court’s opinion in Claiborne). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 928. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 449-50 (Black, J., concurring). 
 142. Id. (emphasis added). 
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doctrine or even expressing hope that something might happen.  As posed by 
Professor Larry Alexander, it is less clear whether words of sarcasm with a 
superficially benign meaning or deliberate attempts to trigger prearranged 
action through otherwise nonsensical code words qualify as advocacy.143  An 
argument that such code qualifies as illegal advocacy can be found in the 
Brandenburg Court’s express rejection of Whitney, where the Court virtually 
refused to consider the circumstances the offending words were used in, 
granting virtual carte blanche to the legislature to make that determination in 
advance.144  With Whitney soundly overruled, courts are free to consider all of 
the circumstances to determine whether speech violates the First Amendment.  
It is not unreasonable, therefore, to conclude that words unambiguously urging 
unlawful action are joined by any speech, which under the circumstances can 
be shown to have been used for the purpose of producing illegal action, as 
being within the definition of “advocacy.”145  Finding “advocacy” on the 
Internet poses no difficulty at all, as shown for example, by a message posted 
on an Al-Qa’idah terrorist site that represents the main ideological direction of 
the global Jihad.146  The message posted at the site encourages Muslims to 
temporarily leave their jobs so they can travel to fight Americans and provides 
information on requesting unpaid leaves of absence to avoid raising suspicion 
for extended absences while carrying out the Jihad duty.147 
2. Imminence 
The element that is most difficult to overcome in an Internet setting is that 
of imminence.  The obvious difficulty is that there is no temporal relationship 
existing between speaker, hearer, and subsequent illegal action.  Brandenburg 
 
 143. Larry Alexander, Incitement and Freedom of Speech, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY 106 (D. Kretzmer and F. Kershman Hasan eds., 2000).  
Professor Alexander poses this question in his essay and arrives at the conclusion that illegal 
advocacy encompasses a somewhat broad scope of language because the term is not restricted by 
the Court to the use of particular words.  His position is contrary to those who would protect 
words that provide information, excluding only specific words of illegal incitement, arguing that 
all words of advocacy are informative at some level.  Id. 
 144. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 647. 
 145. The specific notion that the Internet may be used by terrorists as a means of 
communicating orders and instructions in code to far-flung operative field cells is intriguing.  
Little information exists to demonstrate that it is in fact happening, but the concept is as old as 
World War II, where nonsensical coded instructions, such as “The plume is on the table,” were 
passed by underground radio transmitters to resistance groups located in occupied zones.  
Because it would be relatively easy to do and would contribute to the efforts of terrorist 
organizations to effectively communicate in an innocuous manner, it would be prudent to assume 
that it is being done.  The question is whether such speech would fail to satisfy the Brandenburg 
exception. 
 146. Jeremy Reynalds, American ISP: We’re Not Telling You Why We Host Terrorist Web 
Sites, at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/718268/posts (July 18, 2002). 
 147. Id. 
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and its progeny make it very clear that unless the unlawful action advocated in 
the speech is found to be imminent, the speech will be protected.148  For the 
purposes of analyzing Internet speech, however, this strict requirement 
produces a disturbing anomaly whereby traditional applications of 
Brandenburg can result in protecting speakers who are clearly culpable in the 
realization of terrorism. 
To illustrate the anomaly, consider the following hypothetical: The leader 
of a terrorist front informs all of his followers that they have a duty to kill the 
French and urges them to do so if it is possible.  This directive is posted on a 
website.  At some later time, Forsyth, a follower, is browsing the Internet, 
comes across the leader’s message and reads it.  After giving due consideration 
to his ‘duty,’ he buys a gun, goes to the Eiffel Tower and opens up on the 
crowd, killing a number of innocent people before being overpowered by 
Gendarmes.149 
Forsyth, of course, is going to be prosecuted for the murders he committed, 
but what about the terrorist leader?  He cannot be criminally implicated in 
Forsyth’s acts, but doesn’t he deserve some attention from the justice system 
for the contents of his website?  According to the traditional applications of 
Brandenburg, the terrorist website is safely within the skirts of the First 
Amendment because the connection between publishing the message on the 
Internet and the subsequent illegal act is too remote to acquire the level of 
imminence required by Brandenburg, Hess, and Claiborne. 
There is no question that the terrorist’s speech could be prosecuted if he 
had given it directly to a group of his followers, and one of them had gone out 
and committed the act.  Why then, should a terrorist be shielded because his 
choice for delivering his message was the Internet?  In the next section we’ll 
take a short look at some arguably dangerous websites, and in Section V, we’ll 
consider an application of Brandenburg that would place a terrorist’s message 
beyond the reach of constitutional protection. 
IV.  CYBERSPACE: A PLATFORM FOR GLOBAL ADVOCACY 
According to Professor Jeremy Lipschultz, the Internet offers all users a 
measure of power.150  It is inexpensive, ubiquitous, and easy.  A lone user 
sitting at home possesses the same power to communicate and draw on the 
resources of Cyberspace as the largest corporate user.  Because Cyberspace is 
 
 148. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
 149. KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 263 (1989).  This 
hypothetical is adapted from Greenawalt’s discussion of criminal liability for those whom incite 
unlawful action.  See id. 
 150. JEREMY HARRIS LIPSCHULTZ, FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET 3 
(2000). 
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an arena of power,151 it is also subject to abuse and arguably the power to 
incite others to perform illegal acts.  Three website examples illustrate the 
potential to incite are discussed below. 
A. The Earth Liberation Front (E.L.F.) 
The Earth Liberation Front, considered by the FBI to be the most 
dangerous terrorist group in the United States, has been in existence since the 
mid-90s when it turned to underground “actions” which are nothing more than 
the wanton destruction of targeted properties in its stated effort to “halt the 
destruction of the environment.”  To date, the group claims credit for the 
destruction of one-hundred million dollars of property.152  They have been in 
the news recently as the group responsible for the arson fires that destroyed an 
Oregon tree farm, a university horticulture center in Seattle, a number of 
logging trucks, and a twelve million dollar ski resort at Vail, Colorado.153  The 
general tone of the site is one of a complete and soulless disregard for the 
rights and property of those who are the targets of their destruction.  Their 
movement consists of insulated cells of people, who, without any central 
authority, carry out “actions” in accordance with the group’s guidelines, which 
includes “[e]conomic sabotage and property destruction and calls followers to 
do the following: 
1. To inflict economic damage on those profiting from the destruction and 
exploitation of the natural environment. 
2. To reveal and educate the public on the atrocities committed against the 
earth and all species that populate it. 
3. To take all necessary precautions against harming any animal, human and 
non-human.”154 
According to their website, any “direct action” carried out in accordance 
with the guidelines can be considered an E.L.F. action.155  The Internet is this 
group’s platform for engaging like-minded terrorists and inciting them to 
destroy the property of others.  Contrary to their guidelines, animals have died 
as a result of these actions, and it is only a matter of time before people are 
killed in their attempt at forcing radical environmental views on the nation.  
There is no question that the authors of this website are blatantly inciting 
others to destroy property, and it is working.  This website is contributing to 
millions of dollars of wasteful, useless destruction. 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Earth Liberation Front, at http://www.earthliberationfront.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). 
 153. Terrence Petty, Earth Liberation Front, Stepping up Arson Campaign, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (June 2, 2001) available at http://www.mindfully.org/Heritage/ELF-Stepping-Up.htm. 
 154. See Earth Liberation Front, supra note 152. 
 155. Id. 
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B. The Nuremberg Files 
An equally serious and somewhat infamous website known as “The 
Nuremberg Files” is an anti-abortion website.156  This site lists the names of 
doctors who perform abortions, with the stated reason to keep current lists of 
those who will someday be prosecuted for their acts when abortion is no longer 
legal.  The name of the site is a reference to the Nuremberg war crimes trials 
that put the Nazis on trial following World War II.  The site used an image of 
dripping blood from aborted babies and referred to the abortion doctors as 
“baby butchers.” 
An attempt to stop the website was brought by abortion providers under 
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE)157 alleging the website 
constituted true threats under the act.158  The operator of the site “grayed out” 
the names of the doctors who had been injured and struck a black line through 
the name if a doctor had been killed.159  The Ninth Circuit found that certain 
“wanted” posters and “guilty” posters identifying specific abortion doctors, in 
conjunction with dead and injured doctors listed on the website “scorecard,” 
constituted true threats under the act; nevertheless, the court held that the 
Nuremberg Files website was protected speech.160  The website is still 
functioning and continues to list the names of dead, jailed, and active doctors, 
and in a recent major modification to the site, it has begun to show pictures of 
abortion doctors’ homes and has indicated it will show pictures of where they 
buy gasoline – an obvious reference to the D.C. snipers who shot and killed a 
number of people while they purchased gasoline.161 
C. World Islamic Front 
The following statement was issued by Usama bin Laden as a fatwa162 and 
has been posted on the Internet: 
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an 
individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is 
 
 156. The Nuremburg Files, at http://www.christiangallery.com/atrocity/aborts.html (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2004) (all information articulated in this Section is taken from this website). 
 157. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1)(1999) (This statute was overruled in U.S. v. Bird, No. H-03-0163, 
2003 WL 22016311, at *9 (S.D.Tex Aug. 18, 2003)). 
 158. Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
 159. See The Nuremburg Files, supra note 156.  For a detailed analysis of the Nuremberg 
website, see Gey, supra note 24 at 541. 
 160. See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1088. 
 161. See The Nuremburg Files, supra note 156.  For an argument that sites such as the 
Nuremberg Files possess the power to incite lawless action and should be challenged under an 
Internet incitement standard, see Cronan, supra note 24, at 425. 
 162. A “fatwa” is a religious ruling (command) that provides those who are compelled to 
obey it with the religious and moral justification for the acts it commands. 
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possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque 
from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of 
Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.  This is in accordance with 
the words of Almighty Allah, ‘and fight the pagans all together as they fight 
you all together,’ and ‘fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, 
and there prevail justice and faith in Allah.163 
None of the preceding websites has been challenged under Brandenburg 
because of the problems associated with linking the speech to the acts.  Next, 
we’ll consider an approach that proposes an expansion of the definition of 
imminence for the purposes of Brandenburg that would allow application of 
the exception to certain Internet speech. 
V.  THRESHOLD OF IMMINENCE 
Although it would be fair to say that Harry Kalven was a free-speech 
purist, he made an interesting observation that provides the basis for a 
proposition in support of banning the type of terrorist speech targeted in this 
discussion.164  Professor Kalven noted the distinction between inciting the 
overthrow of a political system as opposed to speech directed toward advocacy 
of non-political crime.165  Political speech advocating the violent overthrow of 
government has value in that criticism of government and society can be used 
to understand the perspective of the speaker and the premise upon which such 
criticism is made.166  There is inherent value if one can gain an understanding 
of one’s critics, especially the most radical ones.  On the other hand, what 
value exists in the advocacy of baseless crime, particularly the wanton and 
senseless crimes encouraged and committed by contemporary terrorists?  A 
line must therefore be drawn between politically oriented speech and speech 
that has no purpose other than to incite terrorist activity solely intended to 
destroy lives, property, and the economic and psychological well-being of an 
open and free society.167  As the Court has stated before, the status of war can 
withdraw First Amendment protection from certain speech.168 The 
unprecedented tragedy arising from the September 11th terrorist attacks has 
established a wartime discipline that has had the effect of modifying the 
behavior of our society and awakening a keen awareness that we are physically 
 
 163. Bin-Laden, et al., supra note 1. 
 164. See KALVEN, supra note 13, at 119. 
 165. Id. at 120. 
 166. Id. 
 167. The Internet today represents for practical purposes, unrestrained speech.  Virtually all 
speech is protected, with very few exceptions.  The Internet is a modern example of the right of a 
free people to publicly dissent and is raising anew the clash between that right and the legitimate 
right of a government to exercise its police power for self-preservation.  See SABIN, supra note 4, 
at xiii. 
 168. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
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unprotected from the effects of terrorism.  We are under attack and are being 
subjected to a type of tyranny that operates to contravene the rights and 
benefits of citizenship accorded by an open and free society.  Until terrorism is 
removed from the world, there exists a “threshold of imminence” such that the 
potential for additional terrorist acts is so great that they must be considered 
imminent.  Under these circumstances, terrorist websites advocating acts 
intended to destroy our society do not warrant the protection of the First 
Amendment.169  Technology often advances more rapidly than the judicial 
system can effectively deal with the changes.170  The Internet has presented 
new challenges to the courts, and because of its dynamic nature it will continue 
to be a center of attention for judicial scrutiny.  But until new questions are 
raised and brought to the attention of the courts through the judicial machinery, 
all that can be done is apply the law that exists.  For First Amendment 
questions of whether incitement type speech is protected, the law is 
Brandenburg.  As discussed in a previous section, the modern incitement 
standard was designed for the soapbox speaker, directly addressing his 
audience, where the advocacy of illegal activity is directed toward inciting or 
producing imminent lawless acts. 
The proposed approach to apply Brandenburg to terrorist advocacy over 
the Internet is to expand the imminence required by the exception to include 
the “threshold of imminence” that has arisen out of the direct terrorist attacks 
and the current state of vulnerability that exists while the threat remains 
unabated.  This approach is limited to the necessarily narrow circumstances 
directly related to the extreme danger posed by international terrorism and our 
current inability to contain it or eliminate it. 
 
 169. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (discussing that not all speech is of 
equal value, and some speech has been identified as so valueless that it makes no contribution 
toward the truth and is therefore undeserving of First Amendment protection). 
 170. This proposition can be found in many areas of the law.  For an example of technology 
outpacing the law relative to the Internet, see ROBERT D. RICHARDS, FREEDOM’S VOICE: THE 
PERILOUS PRESENT AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 80 (1998). 
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A. Criteria/Circumstances Necessary to Establish the “Threshold of 
Imminence” 
A “threshold of imminence” sufficient to satisfy the Brandenburg 
exception exists when the following criteria are established: (1) Terrorist acts 
of the type advocated on terrorist websites have been, or are being, committed 
against the United States, or a state of war exists; and (2) a heightened state of 
national alert has been established by a responsible government agency, 
warning that the potential for such acts exists.171  Finding that a “threshold of 
imminence” exists creates a rebuttable presumption that the imminence 
element of the Brandenburg test has been satisfied for the narrow purposes of 
proscribing the serious172 advocacy of terrorism over the Internet.  Serious 
Internet advocacy is analyzed with respect to the intent and likelihood prongs 
of the Brandenburg incitement test.  Seriousness of the site is determined from 
an objective analysis of three questions: (1) Does the speech contain explicit 
words of action, urging “hearers” to perform specific acts of terrorism; (2) are 
these acts within the scope of those at the genesis of the heightened state of 
alert, or possess the characteristics of those that have in fact been committed; 
and (3) does the speech have any value as political discourse under the whole 
of the circumstances when balanced against the significant danger to society?  
Serious advocacy, in accord with Brandenburg, is not “mere abstract teaching” 
of unpopular ideas or even advocacy of violence that can be offset with more 
speech because more speech is not an answer to serious terrorist advocacy, and 
the marketplace of ideas does not benefit from any discourse.173  With 
advocacy thus established, and the threshold of imminence in place to satisfy 
the “imminence” prong of the test, denial of First Amendment protection for 
the website can be accomplished with the concepts established by the Court in 
Brandenburg, leaving intact the broad protection accorded speech in this 
country. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Establishing a “threshold of imminence” appropriate to the criteria 
presented provides the judiciary with a formulation of the Brandenburg 
incitement standard under sufficiently narrow circumstances that will serve to 
remove the Internet as a platform for the advocacy of terrorist acts bent on the 
catastrophic destruction of property and loss of human life, without 
compromising the expansive reach of modern First Amendment protection.  
 
 171. A responsible government agency may be the Homeland Security Agency, the FBI, or 
the military. 
 172. The advocacy proposed to be withdrawn from First Amendment protection must be 
classified as “serious,” i.e., the speaker actually intends for the acts to be carried out.  This 
intention may be inferred from prior terrorist acts. 
 173. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448. 
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The right of free speech in an open society and the duty that Americans have to 
engage in a political dialogue to express new ideas and to always challenge the 
oppressive tendency of large government and the obligations of that 
government to preserve itself cannot, in the final analysis, be reconciled to 
perfection.  History has shown that the dangers we face as a society often 
require temporary restrictions to expansive freedoms in order that society itself 
may be preserved.  While it is easy to look back on those times and see with 
clarity the mistakes that were made and the excesses of the times, it is not as 
easy to speculate with any degree of accuracy what the future might have 
become under different circumstances.  Nor is it easy to fully understand the 
full import of the circumstances without the benefit of knowing what the future 
wrought. We can, of course, strive to avoid the mistakes of the past, but we 
must not be handcuffed to the past when we are faced with a completely new 
set of circumstances and a danger that is irrational and unexplainable on its 
face.  We face such a danger today.  The threshold of imminence by its very 
nature has already begun to modify our behavior, thus opening the door to 
tyranny.  We cannot let the Internet become a tool of the terrorists to widen the 
opening.  The Internet is a powerful platform that should not be made available 
to the terrorists who are blatantly trying to destroy us. 
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